War behind the talks: Europe in Russia’s coercive strategy

As of 23 February 2026, at least three rounds of contact have taken place — two in Abu Dhabi and one in Geneva — in a trilateral Ukraine-US-Russia format under US mediation to try to end Russia's war against Ukraine. All three rounds ended without a breakthrough. The second one, which took place from 4 to 5 February, produced a concrete outcome in the form of a mutual exchange of 157 war prisoners from each side, despite its ultimate failure to produce a concrete political agreement.

In parallel, the United States and Russia announced their intention to restore military communication channels, while issues of a ceasefire, security guarantees, and territorial questions remain key points of deadlock.

US participation in the current format is one of the principal motives behind Russia’s willingness to engage in these talks. Russian leadership has consistently signalled that it views Washington as the central decision-making authority in European defence, and therefore as the primary counterpart for strategic bargaining.

Managed war and asymmetric incentives

Although it is still too early to speak of results, the conduct of the participants suggests that these have not been negotiations about peace per se, but rather a dialogue — primarily between Russia and the United States — about how to render the war more manageable without forcing either side to abandon their core objectives and positions. Meanwhile, the EU has been largely sidelined and functions more as an observer. The uncomfortable reality is that each party retains its own incentives for the continuation of the war — differing in substance and motivation, but all politically consequential.

For Russia, this interest is the most direct and systemic. The war functions as a legitimising insurance policy for the regime. Moscow also instrumentalises the war as leverage in bargaining over revisions to the international order and recognition of its sphere of influence. Putin’s government therefore viewed the negotiations in Abu Dhabi not as a venue for ending the war but rather as a testing ground to assess whether the West was ready for concessions. In the negotiations, Russia has appeared to hold the stronger position: it is under no pressure to rush, and the protracted nature of the conflict aligns with its broader political strategy of time-based coercive bargaining aimed at eroding European unity and resolve. Drawing out the conflict also aids in shaping a potential settlement toward Moscow’s core objective — namely, securing a dominant position and de facto sphere of influence in Europe’s security order.

For the United States, the interest in prolongation is conditional but tangible. Washington seeks to avoid direct confrontation with Russia, yet a managed war may yield strategic dividends (Sonnenfeld & Tian; Stein; Łoskot-Strachota; Reuters). This approach aims not at escalation for its own sake, but calibrated containment at manageable cost.

The European Union has a paradoxical stake in continuation as the lesser evil compared to an “ugly deal,” particularly if a premature settlement would allow Russia to regroup and redirect pressure toward Europe’s eastern flank. From this perspective, delaying an end to the conflict buys time for rearmament and strategic adjustment. However, the risks for the EU are substantial: societal fatigue, intra-EU divisions, political forces advocating peace at any price (Eurofound; Holescha; EPC), and the possibility that, at a critical juncture, Europe may find itself without firm American backing.

Ukraine is the only participant for whom prolonging the war carries no intrinsic benefit. Yet, Kyiv may be compelled to continue fighting if the terms of the proposed peace are more dangerous than war. For Ukraine, a ceasefire without credible security guarantees would not constitute true peace, but rather a continuation of the war in a grey-zone format. Such a format would carry a built-in risk of escalation, as Russia would retain both the capability and the incentive to resume pressure whenever conditions start to look favorable. Ukraine faces the most difficult negotiating position, as the country bears the highest costs, controls few of the decisive external levers, and cannot afford a miscalculation (as a 'bad pause' may ultimately threaten its statehood).

War and negotiations since 2014

A realistic assessment of the prospects for achieving a peaceful settlement in the Russian-Ukrainian war — and of the likely terms of such a settlement — requires some historical context and the adoption of an appropriate analytical lens.

Russia has been waging war against Ukraine for twelve years. On 20 February 2014, the occupation of Crimea began. Russian troops without insignia (the so-called ‘little green men’) blocked Ukrainian military units and key infrastructure facilities. On 16 March 2014, the Russian Federation staged an illegal referendum and, shortly thereafter, carried out the unlawful annexation of the peninsula. Subsequently, in April 2014, hostilities spread to eastern Ukraine, where, with the involvement of Russia-backed forces and Russian sabotage groups, administrative buildings were seized and armed confrontation escalated.

Since 2014, negotiations aimed at resolving the conflict have been conducted – through both the Normandy format (Ukraine-Russia-Germany-France) and the Trilateral Contact Group (Ukraine-Russia-OSCE). However, prospects for a successful settlement have remained slim (Åtland; Dumoulin). The reason is that, for the Russian regime, an external conflict is not merely a convenient instrument of foreign policy but also a necessary mechanism for sustaining domestic legitimacy.

This logic helps explain a recurring feature of Russian negotiations from Transnistria to Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Ukraine: they are often designed not to achieve a final agreement, but to consolidate a favourable status quo as a springboard for subsequent demands and renewed escalation (Grossman; Wolff). In all of these instances, Russian demands have left little room for genuine compromise and, taken together, tend to pose a threat to the 'ontological security' (that is, the sovereignty and identity) of the other side.

The key distinguishing element of the current negotiations around the Russian-Ukrainian war is the direct presence of the United States. Indeed, this factor is precisely what should determine the analytical lens. Recent Russia-US talks can be read through the Harvard negotiation framework, which argues that effective negotiation is not about winning, but about jointly solving a problem by aligning interests, expanding options, grounding decisions in objective standards, and strengthening one’s BATNA (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement). Meanwhile, negotiations conducted through the Normandy format and Trilateral Contact Group often looked more like coercive diplomacy, with negotiations functioning as an instrument of pressure and a channel for the imposition of constraints.

Various scholars offer a realistic account of Russia’s approach to negotiations, highlighting instruments such as coercive diplomacy (using credible threats and limited force to shape negotiations), managed uncertainty (keeping intentions and escalation thresholds ambiguous to maximise leverage), and sequencing (dividing talks into incremental steps that secure advantages before final settlement) (Åtland; Umland & Essen; Soldatenko). These tools are not Russian inventions; they are part of a standard repertoire in conflicts characterised by power asymmetry. However, as many analysts note, what distinguishes the Russian approach is the particular combination and intensity of these instruments — and, above all, the purposive logic that governs their application.

Partner or target?

This purposive logic is central to understanding the Kremlin’s conduct. Since 2014, negotiations over Russia’s war against Ukraine have functioned less as a path to peace than as coercive bargaining over the foundations of the international order and European security. In this framework, Ukraine has operated as a testing ground — a venue through which the West could be pressed to accept a new normal. This external strategy aligns with the regime’s internal logic: a state of protracted confrontation enables mobilisation against an external enemy and legitimises intensified internal repression, thereby reinforcing political stability.

The same strategic objectives appear to underpin Russia’s current talks with the United States. In what the Kremlin frames as ‘negotiations among equals,’ Moscow is not primarily bargaining over Ukraine’s territorial concessions, but rather over spheres of influence and the rules of European security — demands that remain broadly consistent with the orientations articulated as early as in Putin’s 2007 Munich speech. Given the relative clarity with which Russian officials have signalled this agenda, Western readings centred mainly on the territorial dimension may have underestimated the broader strategic stakes — and, in turn, led to policy decisions that were less effective than they could have been.

Another vulnerability in Europe’s policy towards Russia is the asymmetry in how the relationship is perceived. While the EU and many member states have approached Russia as an equal negotiating counterpart, the Kremlin treats Europe primarily as a target for influence projection (Karlsen; Gomart et al.). This seems counterintuitive given the EU’s economic weight. Yet, influential strands of Russia’s political elite portray European democracies as structurally fragile and particularly susceptible to externally driven, manipulative influence — what the literature terms sharp power (Lovato & Simon; Gomart et al.). In that view, Europe is less a partner arena than an object for expanding Russia's sphere of influence.

The current crisis in transatlantic relations has deepened this asymmetry. The EU can mitigate it only by recalibrating its lens and treating Russia’s posture toward the EU as potentially coercive rather than mainly reciprocal. The core question should not merely be about how to resume talks, but rather about how to build conditions in which coercion and escalation stop yielding bargaining dividends and instead trigger predictable costs.

In essence, the task is to narrow the gap between Europe’s instinct for reciprocity and Russia’s unilateral logic of pressure. This can be achieved by focusing on the institutional, material, and normative measures that both reduce the EU’s exposure to blackmail and sharp power and strengthen its capacity to shape, rather than absorb, the negotiating framework.

Tags: War, Ukraine, Russia, Europe, negotiations