Why a compromise over Ukraine won’t end the Russia-Ukraine war

Discussions about a potential ceasefire in the Russia-Ukraine war often centre on the concessions Ukraine might offer to halt active hostilities. However, a realistic evaluation of the prospects for peace or even a truce must pay attention to Russia’s objectives in waging this war.

Proposals for Ukrainian concessions often ignore that Russia’s demands target not just Ukraine but, more broadly, the West, especially the US. For Russia, war is a tool to force a revision of the European security system and the global order. Its allies—China, Iran, and North Korea—aren’t backing Russia simply to annex Ukrainian territories, but to pursue a larger goal: redefining global spheres of influence and rewriting the rules of international relations. Russian conditions for ending hostilities in Ukraine, among others, include: Ukraine’s subjugation to Russian control; a reduced US role in European politics; and a new European security framework, with a buffer zone of NATO countries in Central and Eastern Europe.

These demands align with earlier Russian proposals to reshape European security, such as the 2008-2009 draft European Security Treaty and OSCE reforms, aiming to grant Russia veto power over Euro-Atlantic security decisions. Russia’s 2021 draft treaties with NATO and the US, preceding its invasion of Ukraine, similarly demanded a Russian zone of influence in former Soviet territories, NATO’s rollback to 1997 borders, and restrictions on Western security cooperation with Ukraine. In turn, the draft Treaty on Permanent Neutrality and Security Assurances for Ukraine of 2022 explicitly provides for the obligation of the United States, France, and the United Kingdom not to cooperate with Ukraine in the security sphere and the obligation to obtain Russia’s consent to any assistance to Ukraine in the event of external aggression against it (Article 5). Notably, it’s worth mentioning that, in February 2022, China supported Russia’s demands for “long-term legally binding security guarantees in Europe.”

Russian escalating demands

The trajectory of Russian proposals shows an unchanged core with escalating rhetoric. Over time, Russia has expanded its demands from post-Soviet influence to a broader sphere encompassing former Warsaw Pact countries. By reshaping political realities, Russia aims to make once-unthinkable goals negotiable and achievable.

Russia’s success in creating a new political reality in Europe with, for example, the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and in undermining European security has several key foundations, beginning with the West’s misunderstanding of Russian strategic culture, behaviour, and intentions. Russia’s strategic culture is steeped in authoritarian norms, historical grievances, and revisionism, viewing international relations as a zero-sum game where the boundaries of action are dictated solely by the balance of power. It would be true to say that there has never been a democracy in Russia; rather, its semblance was a calculated strategy to convince Western nations that closer ties posed no threat.

This miscalculation—whether due to perceptual blindness or the allure of energy cooperation—allowed Moscow to gradually reshape the European security landscape. First, it undermined institutions like the Council of Europe and the OSCE, eroding their authority. Then, Russia escalated to overt violations of territorial integrity, culminating in full-scale war with Ukraine.

Another pillar of Russia’s foreign policy success is the West’s limited approach (see Fabrizio Coticchia & Jonas J. Driedger) to rethinking its own security strategies even in the face of Russian threats. This inertia in defense paradigms has persisted despite significant shocks, such as the annexation of Crimea and the onset of a major war in Europe. Even today, NATO members differ in their perception of the Russian threat. Some do not see Russia’s actions as a direct danger to their territorial integrity or security, weakening NATO’s collective defense posture. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which leaves the response to aggression up to each member state’s discretion, further exacerbates this uncertainty. This ambiguity creates doubts about NATO’s commitments and provides Russia with opportunities to test the alliance’s resolve.

Conflict scenarios and Russian war of attrition

Among the scenarios analysed by John Lough, Associate Fellow of the Russia and Eurasia Programme, in a Chatham House report, three out of four—‘Long war,’ ‘Frozen conflict,’ and ‘Defeat for Ukraine’—favour Russia (the fourth one being ‘Victory for Ukraine’). As the initial shock of its aggression fades, many Western countries might seek reconciliation with Moscow, potentially entertaining its terms for creating a buffer zone in Central and Eastern Europe. However, such zones would serve only as platforms for Russia to expand its control. Neutrality or a ‘buffer zone’ would inevitably become a launching pad for further Russian influence and aggression.

Putin appears confident in Russia’s prospects for achieving a strategic breakthrough, both in Ukraine and in its broader confrontation with the West. This belief underpins Moscow’s unwillingness to end the war. Western strategies of limited deterrence and sanctions have failed to significantly weaken Russia, allowing its economy to adapt to wartime conditions. The war has become both a necessity and a stabilizing force for the Russian regime, making its continuation integral to domestic political cohesion.

Russia is waging a war of attrition, relying on cheap resources, mass-produced technologies, and support from China. Although China officially remains in the background, it provides Russia with critical political, economic, and technological assistance. Beijing benefits from Russia’s role as a proxy in its rivalry with the United States (Foreign Affairs ; Brookings), with Moscow shouldering the risks and costs of direct confrontation with the West.

Western strategic dilemmas

Western policy remains constrained by strategic dilemmas, such as avoiding both a Russian victory and a Russian collapse. Narratives fueled by Russian propaganda—such as fears of nuclear instability—discourage stronger support for Ukraine. Another perspective shaping Western policy toward Russia is promoted by the Russian opposition in exile, which argues that Russia can transition to a liberal democratic state while maintaining its stability and territorial integrity (Le Monde ; Tagesspiegel). Critics, however, contend that Russia’s lack of homogeneity makes this unlikely, as successful liberalization would likely trigger decolonization and eventual disintegration. The argument that Russia is unlikely to democratise or liberalise is supported by examples of past failed attempts at reform, each of which led to instability and a return to authoritarianism (Oleksiy Panych ; Andrei Kolesnikov).

At present, with the help of the war of attrition, where Ukraine is rapidly being depleted, Russia is more effectively undermining the Euro-Atlantic security order than the West is containing it. The Kremlin has sufficient financial and human resources to sustain its war effort at least for the next few years. Despite the reported risks which the Russian economy faces today, the Kremlin may have sufficient financial and human resources to sustain its war effort at least for the next few years. A sociological study  by the Center for Analysis and Strategies in Europe (CASE) indicates that millions of Russian men are willing to participate in the war, while their Analysis of the state and processes in the Russian economy shows the ability of the Russian Federation to meet wartime needs.

A truce or a lasting peace?

The belief that compromise or concessions by Ukraine could end the war is misguided. Such agreements would likely lead to temporary de-escalation, enabling Russia to consolidate gains. In this, unless strategies change, a truce won’t bring lasting peace, as Russia remains an aggressive, war-dependent state.

To stop Russia’s aggression and secure a lasting peace, the war must be made unprofitable and dangerous for the Russian regime, or Russia must be weakened to the point where it can no longer wage war. All compromise solutions will be perceived in Moscow as intermediate victories, encouraging further escalation. A lasting peace depends on profound internal transformations within Russia, which include a political regime change. In the short term, however, a truce may be achievable if the West abandons its anti-escalation approach and adopts a strategy of decisive deterrence.

Tags: War, Ukraine, Russia