When connectivity becomes a threat: internet shutdowns and the erosion of the public sphere in Iran

While the formal framework of rights protection in Iran continues to exist on paper, a deeper erosion is taking place beneath the surface. Constitutional guarantees and international obligations under human rights treaties remain nominally intact, yet the practical conditions required to exercise these rights are steadily weakening. In moments of political unrest, the Iranian government deliberately restricts access to information, communication, and digital connectivity. As a result, the public sphere contracts, trust in institutions erodes further, and collective political life is pushed into darkness.

In the current wave of protests, repression in Iran has not relied solely on arrests, violence, or judicial intimidation. Instead, it has increasingly taken an infrastructural form. Internet shutdowns in Iran, severe throttling, and restrictions on digital platforms are deployed to disrupt communication at scale. This reflects a broader transformation in contemporary governance: In societies where political participation is deeply intertwined with digital networks, control over connectivity becomes a central instrument of power. When communication collapses, the public sphere collapses with it.

This dynamic has become a recurring concern in international debates on digital rights and authoritarian governance. Across diplomatic statements, human rights reporting, and expert discussions, the same underlying questions surface: What happens to political participation when communication infrastructures are treated as security threats? What happens to accountability when information cannot circulate? And how should external actors, including the European Union, respond when a state systematically disables the digital foundations of public life?

Freedom of expression in the digital age

At the core of this debate lies a foundational principle of international human rights law. Freedom of expression is not limited to the ability to speak. It includes the right to seek, receive, and impart information through any media and regardless of frontiers. In environments where traditional media are tightly controlled and physical assemblies are constrained, the internet becomes the primary space in which these rights are realised.

In Iran, this role is particularly pronounced. Digital platforms enable access to alternative sources of information, facilitate collective organisation, and allow individuals to document and share experiences that would otherwise remain invisible. When access to the internet is disrupted, these functions are simultaneously undermined. The harm therefore extends well beyond inconvenience. Internet shutdowns interfere with the effective exercise of multiple rights, including freedom of expression, access to information, and peaceful assembly.

From a legal perspective, blanket shutdowns—the intentional and total disruption of internet connectivity for an entire population or geographic area—raise serious concerns. International human rights standards require restrictions on expression to be lawful, necessary, and proportionate. Indiscriminate disruptions applied to entire regions or populations during protests are difficult to reconcile with these criteria, particularly when they are implemented without transparency, judicial oversight, or effective remedies. The result is a form of restriction that is both far-reaching and largely unaccountable.

The political logic of shutdowns

The repeated use of internet shutdowns during protests is not accidental. It reflects a clear political logic. By interrupting connectivity, the state fragments collective action. Protesters lose the ability to coordinate, share information, or respond rapidly to changing conditions. At the same time, the circulation of images, testimonies, and real-time reporting is curtailed, limiting both domestic awareness and international scrutiny.

Equally important is the uncertainty that shutdowns produce. When communication becomes unreliable, fear spreads faster than verified information. Individuals are left isolated, unsure of events beyond their immediate surroundings. This uncertainty reshapes behaviour, encouraging withdrawal and self-censorship even in the absence of direct coercion. In this sense, internet shutdowns function as a form of repression that operates through disorientation rather than force alone.

Crucially, this strategy also affects how events are remembered. By disrupting real-time documentation, shutdowns create informational gaps that can later be filled by official narratives. What cannot be seen, shared, or verified in the moment becomes easier to contest or deny after the fact. Control over connectivity thus translates into control over historical record.

Accountability under conditions of disconnection

These dynamics have direct implications for accountability. When internet access is restricted, monitoring human rights violations becomes slower, riskier, and more fragmented. Journalists, civil society organisations, and international bodies are forced to rely on partial data collected under difficult conditions and often reconstructed only after connectivity is restored.

As a result, accountability increasingly depends on documentation rather than enforcement. Evidence is gathered, preserved, and analysed, but immediate consequences remain elusive. This is not a matter of choice, but of structural limitation. When coercive or judicial mechanisms are politically constrained, documentation becomes the primary means of maintaining responsibility over time.

The establishment of international fact-finding mechanisms, such as the UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Iran, reflects this reality. Their mandate is not to impose instant sanctions or remedies, but to ensure that violations are recorded and preserved. Documentation prevents erasure. It keeps open the possibility that acts committed during moments of enforced silence may later be subjected to legal or political scrutiny, even if immediate enforcement is unavailable.

A system of digital control

The recurring use of shutdowns in Iran points to a broader system of control. Security institutions treat communication as a destabilising force. Legal ambiguity allows restrictions to be framed as temporary or technical measures, thereby situating internet shutdowns in a regulatory grey zone rather than clearly within the framework of human rights law. Telecommunications infrastructure is organised in ways that enable centralised disruption. Domestic accountability mechanisms remain weak, reducing internal constraints on the use of such tools.

At the international level, responses are shaped by similar structural limits. In Iran, and in other protest contexts such as Myanmar, India, and Sudan, internet shutdowns occupy a grey zone between security policy, telecommunications regulation, and human rights law. States often present such measures as exceptional responses to unrest rather than as structural violations. This framing complicates external action and contributes to the persistent gap between condemnation and consequence.

The European Union’s response

Within this context, the European Union’s engagement with the situation in Iran has increasingly framed access to information as a human rights concern, rather than a merely technical issue. EU institutions in previous cases have condemned disproportionate repression, called for the restoration of internet access, and extended restrictive measures in response to the violent repression of protests, including mass arrests, the use of lethal force, and restrictions on access to information and communication in Iran.

These actions signal an important normative shift. Control over digital communication is no longer treated as peripheral, but as part of the architecture of repression. At the same time, the limits of these measures are evident. Political statements and sanctions do not directly restore connectivity, nor do they immediately deter shutdowns. Their impact is indirect and cumulative, aimed at increasing political costs and reinforcing international expectations.

For such measures to be meaningful, coherence across policy domains is essential. Human rights diplomacy, sanctions regimes, and technology governance must operate in tandem. Without this coordination, responses risk remaining symbolic, reinforcing documentation without strengthening enforcement.

Conclusions: the public sphere in the age of digital repression

The situation in Iran illustrates a broader transformation in how political power is exercised in the digital age. Control over information infrastructure has become as central as control over physical space. When the internet is shut down, the public sphere does not simply weaken; it temporarily ceases to function. Rights remain formally recognised, but their practical exercise becomes impossible.

In this context, the reliance on documentation should not be mistaken for resignation. Recording shutdowns, preserving evidence, and tracing responsibility are acts of resistance against enforced invisibility. They ensure that moments of repression are not normalised or forgotten. Yet documentation alone cannot substitute for enforcement.

Ultimately, the struggle over internet access in Iran is not a technical dispute about connectivity. It is a struggle over political agency, visibility, and participation. Protecting the digital public sphere is therefore not only about keeping networks online. It is about safeguarding the conditions under which rights can be exercised, dissent can be expressed, and accountability can remain imaginable, even when the state attempts to govern through silence.

Tags: Iran, Internet, freedom of expression