“More partner and less rival”: exploring issue-specific cooperation in EU-China relations

As EU-China diplomatic relations mark their 50th anniversary in 2025, the future of ties between Brussels and Beijing remains a focal point of debate. Speaking at the EUI in May 2025, European Council President António Costa responded to my question about his upcoming meeting with Chinese leaders in Beijing, noting that both sides share a common will “to be more partner and less rival.” What does this mean in practice, and how can it be achieved amid divergences and mounting trade tensions? This EUIdeas piece addresses these questions by reviewing the evolving dynamics of EU-China relations and using the World Trade Organisation (WTO) reform as an illustrative case of how engagement can be pursued in practice. Rather than examining WTO reform in depth, it aims to highlight the value of issue-specific cooperation in advancing the bilateral relationship.

The bygone “golden age” between the EU and China

Since diplomatic relations were established in 1975, the then-European Community and China have developed a broad and increasingly interdependent relationship, particularly in relation to economic ties. Bilateral trade has expanded significantly over the past decades. Today, trade in goods between China and the EU exceeds 2 billion euros per day, making them among each other’s most important trading partners.

Beyond economic ties, a number of dialogue mechanisms have been established since the 1990s to facilitate cooperation and manage differences across a wide range of sectors. These dialogues, conducted both at the diplomatic level and among technical and academic experts, have become increasingly institutionalised across policy areas from climate change and human rights to education, technology, and civil society. This mechanism reached a peak between 2003 and 2005 — a period many researchers have characterised as the “golden age” of EU-China relations.

A landmark moment during this golden age came in 2003, when Brussels and Beijing agreed to upgrade their relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership. In its 2003 policy document, ‘A maturing partnership,’ the European Commission described China as “one of the EU’s major strategic partners” and outlined its vision for cooperation built on shared interests, such as sustainable development, peace, and stability.

The establishment of this comprehensive strategic partnership elevated EU-China relations to unprecedented heights. During a visit to Beijing in April 2004, then-President of the European Commission Romano Prodi declared that EU-China relations were at their best in history. A month later in Brussels, Prodi reaffirmed that view, stating that “relations have never been better” and notably commenting that even if the ties were not quite a marriage, they were “at least a very serious engagement.”

The EU’s shifting perception of China

This golden age proved difficult to sustain as the EU’s perception of China became increasingly influenced by differences in governance models and economic systems, alongside concerns over economic security and dependencies on China in critical supply chains. These concerns have gradually come to dominate how European academics and policymakers view and address China, steering Brussels towards a more strategic, security-oriented approach.

A key turning point came with the European Commission’s 2019 strategic outlook on China, later endorsed by the European Council. In this document, the Commission revised its policy stance based on the “known triptych”, characterising China simultaneously as a partner for cooperation, an economic competitor, and a systemic rival. This seemingly contradictory formulation marks a de facto departure from the EU’s previous perception of China as “a strategic partner.”

This shift in policy language mirrors not only the EU’s evolving perception of China, but also more profound changes in their respective positions and roles in the global landscape. As such, this formulation — partner, competitor, and rival — is a reflection of the EU’s broader adjustment to the dynamics that had taken shape in the bilateral relationship since the end of the golden age. Building on this, in 2023, the European Commission formulated a “de-risking” strategy in its relations with China, aimed at maintaining engagement while reducing dependencies and avoiding a wider economic decoupling.

In practice, the EU’s recalibrated policy stance towards China has taken shape in a range of regulatory tools, including foreign direct investment screening, and rules on foreign subsidies and critical raw materials, as well as measures in sensitive sectors such as 5G and other critical technologies. These instruments are said to have been developed in the shadow of growing concerns related to China.

More recently, there has been an increase in legal investigations targeting Chinese companies operating within the EU. In particular, the EU has stepped up its use of foreign subsidies rules, on the grounds that industrial subsidies linked to the Chinese government may distort competition in the EU internal market. For its part, China has consistently emphasised that the two sides are “naturally partners rather than rivals.” It has also criticised Brussels’s increasing recourse to unilateral trade instruments that Beijing views as protectionist. Nevertheless, a profound divide persists in how each side perceives the other and defines the parameters of their relationship.

This fundamental shift in the EU’s approach towards China, together with mounting trade tensions and broader concerns over market practices — for example, China’s recent export restrictions on critical raw materials — has overshadowed the July 2025 EU-China leaders’ summit, which marked the 50th anniversary of bilateral diplomatic relations. Ultimately, the commemorative event was held in a relatively modest manner, with the only tangible outcome being a joint statement reaffirming a shared willingness to cooperate on climate actions. Such humble results were consistent with pre-summit reports that the mutual expectations for the event to reach any concrete agreement were limited.

The way forward: identifying pragmatic pathways for issue-specific cooperation

In today’s geopolitical context, EU-China relations face a markedly different environment from that of the golden age more than two decades ago. Yet, the two sides remain too important to simply decouple. The key question, therefore, is determining how the EU and China can maintain engagement and foster cooperation despite persistent differences over trade, security, and values.

A potential blueprint can be found in a recent academic recommendation on reforming the WTO, which sets out concrete proposals for EU-China cooperation to restore the WTO’s core functions. These proposals include dispute settlement mechanisms and broader rule modernisation, particularly in areas such as digital trade, services, investment facilitation, and industrial policy. Co-initiated by Professor Guohua Yang, a law professor at Tsinghua University and a China-appointed arbitrator under the WTO Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement, and Mr John Alistair Clarke, a former senior trade official who led the EU’s delegation to the WTO, the proposal calls on the EU and China to work together to advance WTO reform and restore its effectiveness in the multilateral trade system, particularly in the context of the growing disruption in global trade.

This proposal was presented at an EUI event and circulated among policymakers from both sides in the run-up to the 50th anniversary summit. It did not develop in a vacuum: as the authors noted explicitly, this proposal “draws upon a number of documents submitted to the WTO by both China and the EU, as well as initiatives launched by either party.” Its structure and substance are largely modelled on an existing European Commission policy document on WTO reform, with the additional incorporation of positions reflected in Chinese policy papers. The proposal further draws on a range of trade-related initiatives and documents, including the stalled EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment, concluded in principle at the end of 2020, and China’s bids to join the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership.

In doing so, the proposal carefully marks out the areas of shared interest and policy convergence on WTO reform — such as dispute settlement reform, trade and sustainability, modernisation of WTO rules, and the incorporation of plurilateral agreements into the WTO framework — that could, in principle, be acceptable for policymakers on both sides. While it may not capture all aspects of WTO reform, it nonetheless sets out a concrete agenda centred on areas of policy convergence, offering a starting point for Brussels and Beijing to work together.

Conclusion

This proposal illustrates a practical approach to facilitating EU-China cooperation on a specific high-stakes issue. While it remains academic in nature and was unfortunately not taken up at the official level prior to the 50th anniversary summit due to an unexpected escalation in trade tensions, it nonetheless represents a credible and constructive attempt to promote EU-China cooperation. Its value lies in what it illustrates: namely, that cooperation remains possible where shared interests and policy convergence exist, particularly when engagement is confined to specific policy issues.

Beyond trade, the proposal offers a valuable reference for other areas of EU-China cooperation. By identifying specific policy domains where positions converge — as seen here in academic efforts to promote WTO reform — and outlining shared policy preferences and reform pathways, both sides can develop effective avenues for targeted cooperation without requiring broader policy alignment. A recent example can be found in the field of carbon market regulation. On 7 May 2026, China and the EU, together with Brazil, announced the launch of the Open Coalition on Compliance Carbon Markets at the EUI in Florence as an intergovernmental forum for dialogue on domestic carbon markets and carbon pricing policies. The Coalition also illustrates how issue-specific cooperation can be pursued within the narrowly defined regulatory field, even as differences over particular regulatory approaches persist.

In an increasingly fragmented and uncertain international environment, such issue-specific cooperation represents a vital first step. It offers a tangible way for the EU and China to recalibrate their relationship towards being “more partner and less rival.”

Tags: EU, China, International Relations, EU-China relations