COP30: geopolitics, climate diplomacy, and the South Pacific

The 30^th United Nations (UN) Conference of the Parties (COP30), the UN global event for discussions and negotiations on climate change, will bring together signatories of the Paris Agreement this month in Belem, Brazil, to determine shared commitments to addressing climate change.

Ten years since the Paris Agreement, COP30’s focus will be: financing the climate transition; climate adaptation (helping countries adjust to climate change impacts); the energy transition (moving away from fossil fuels); and implementation by countries of the agreed-upon commitments.

COP30 will also include presentation of updated nationally determined contributions (NDCs) – the five-year roadmaps of individual parties aimed at reaching Paris targets. Under the Paris Agreement, signatories agreed to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions in order to hold the increase in global average temperature below two degrees centigrade above pre-industrial levels and pursue efforts to limit further warming to 1.5 degrees C above pre-industrial levels.

In a world characterised by competition, fragmentation, and power politics, geopolitical power plays, regional dynamics, and civil society lobbying will once again underlie the multilateral negotiations.

Within this tense geopolitical environment, one small group of nations actively advocating for strong action on climate will be the Pacific Island Countries (PICs), which are disproportionately affected by climate change due to their location and geography. Because of their location, PICs are also at the centre of intense geopolitical competition between Australia and China, with the latter recently showing increasing interest in the region. This competition yields significant bilateral leverage for PICs.

This article explores whether the PIC’s bilateral leverage will translate into meaningful influence at the multilateral level, as well as what outcomes this might generate at COP30.

Geopolitical tensions: China, Australia, and the South Pacific

Australia-China relations have deteriorated in recent years. Australia’s Foreign Minister Penny Wong said last year that Australia is in a “permanent contest in the Pacific.”

While Australia has been the PIC’s largest trading partner and aid donor, China has gradually been encroaching on what Australia sees as its “patch” – a shift enabled by Australia’s neglect of the region for a number of years.

China’s motivation stems from the Pacific region’s strategic importance in the People’s Republic of China’s ongoing tensions with Taiwan. Increased engagement through investment in infrastructure, support with policing and security training, trade and aid has quickly made China the dominant economic partner for many small PICs.

Fear and speculation have mounted in Australia, the United States, New Zealand, and some PICs, including Fiji, about the rumoured establishment of a Chinese military base in the Pacific Islands – something China denies. However, some real-world developments back up these fears: in early 2025, China carried out naval training exercises in the ocean between Australia and New Zealand.

Competitive China-Australia tensions have brought bilateral leverage for PICs. One area in which such leverage has been particularly powerful has been the energy and climate sphere.

Energy and climate diplomacy in the Pacific

Climate change mitigation, adaptation, and resilience is a key priority for PICs, which are especially exposed to the severe threats of climate change. Impacts include gradual sinking (due to rising sea levels) and greater prevalence and intensity of extreme weather events. In 2020, for example, Tropical Cyclone Harold killed 27 people and caused widespread damage in Vanuatu, Fiji, the Solomon Islands, and Tonga. In 2023, Tropical Cyclone Lola caused four deaths and severely damaged public infrastructure and housing in Vanuatu, as well as causing damage in the Solomon Islands.

Research indicates that extreme weather costs vulnerable island nations $141 billion each year, potentially rising to $1 trillion annually by 2030. Vanuatu, for example, stands to lose half its GDP each time a severe cyclone hits.

With this existential threat looming, PICs are actively transitioning to renewable energy with support from Australia and China – Australia largely assists through partnerships, while China is investing directly in infrastructure.

At COP29, the Australian government announced a partnership with PICs to enhance energy security and grid transition through an investment of 125 million Australian dollars in renewable energy. It later announced a further nine million Australian dollars to assist Pacific nations in developing their NDCs.

Australia is further signalling its commitment to working with PICs to address climate change by vying to host 2026’s COP31 with Pacific nations. Turkey is also competing to host the next conference. The host of the 2026 edition will be announced at the Belem conference.

Australia’s strategic positioning in relation to PICs is not limited to climate and energy diplomacy. In August, for example,  Australia signed a $328m security and business deal with Vanuatu.

China, meanwhile, is moving to implement renewable energy infrastructure in the Pacific. In late May, China announced increased support to PICs in addressing climate change through 100 "small but beautiful" projects over the next three years. It also announced a $2 million (USD) investment in Pacific nations’ clean energy, fisheries, ocean management, low-carbon infrastructure, and tourism sectors.

While PICs have adeptly manoeuvred China-Australia tensions to garner support for the energy transition and beyond, they also have expressed disappointment with the outcomes of recent COPs, as explored in the following section.

COP30: from bilateral influence to global negotiations

At COPs 26, 27, and 28, some countries emphasised that the impacts of climate change would be much lower at a temperature increase of 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels, compared with 2 °C, and resolved to commit to limit global warming to 1.5°C. PICs are strongly committed to the 1.5°C target and will again advocate for ambitious action at COP30.

According to the Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme, multilateral environmental agreements have fallen short because “international rules and norms favour the few nations who want no action, over the vast majority of nations who want to address the crises.” A 2023 study by Lund University and the University of Leeds shared this view. By analysing fifteen previous COPs, it argued that economic power translates to negotiating power, preventing smaller countries from voicing their interests and negotiating effectively.

Without a cap on delegate numbers representing any one party and in the absence of restrictions on the access of lobbyists supporting the status quo, smaller countries are easily outnumbered. Moreover, this year, the high cost and scarcity of accommodation at Belem is a widely known problem.

Through negotiation blocs like One Pacific Voice and the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), which coordinates 39 small island developing states, PICs have had some influence, including the COP28 agreement to the establishment of a ‘loss and damage fund’ for vulnerable countries. However, PIC representatives nevertheless felt that the deal did not extend far enough.

Papua New Guinea showed its lack of faith in COP by boycotting COP29 due to perceived “empty promises and inaction,” while AOSIS and the Least Developed Countries voting blocs walked out of COP29 negotiations over climate finance after not feeling consulted or listened to.

Vanuatu circumvented COP processes entirely by successfully requesting a landmark ruling by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in July 2025, which requires all states to protect the climate, prevent further harms, and comply with their duty to cooperate. In addition to these obligations, the ruling requires signatories to the Paris Agreement to make their NDCs as ambitious as possible for collective achievement of the 1.5°C global warming target. At the COP meeting in Belem, PICs will look to build on the ICJ ruling and advocate for greater global ambition as One Pacific Voice.

China is now one of the largest powers at COP. Despite the Pacific’s bilateral influence with China, China’s 2035 NDC target amounts only to a “fraction of the 30% cut needed” to reduce global greenhouse emissions to the less ambitious Paris target of 2 °C. Australia’s new target (a 62 to 70% reduction compared to 2005 levels) is also not considered ambitious enough to align with the 1.5 °C pathway favored by PICs.

With developing nations increasingly asserting their agency and advocating for development on their own terms, and without the United States in attendance, a key question remains: Will the Pacific Island Countries’ bilateral and transactional influence successfully translate onto the global and multilateral level at this COP?

It is in the European Union’s interests for a strong Pacific voice to be heard. In a tense geopolitical environment, such a voice would help the EU affirm its Green Deal goals, maintain its global relevance, and hold larger emerging economies accountable for rising emissions.

Tags: United Nations, COP30, Climate Change, South Pacific, Geopolitics