The evolving rationale behind Russian attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure

Since February 2022, Ukraine has faced an unstoppable Russian determination to destroy its critical infrastructure. A central focus of Russian military offensives has been to use air strikes consisting of missiles and drones targeting different types of Ukrainian energy infrastructure. Without functional power generation, Ukraine would have succumbed to Russian control. This motivation has driven the Russian military strategy of deliberately destroying Ukraine’s energy potential. To illustrate Russia’s rationale, this article outlines three stages of Russian war tactics towards the energy sector in Ukraine.

Three phases in Russia’s attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure

In wartime, the ability to shut down power generation gives an upper hand to the aggressor on the battleground. In military terms, impairing the enemy’s energy potential increases the chances of gaining the advantage in a war through the following mechanisms: a) the economy loses production resources; b) the population is induced to feel despair and subordination to the aggressor’s will; and c) the military loses its orientation on the front line.

Destroying the ‘energy engines’ of a country at war has serious ramifications for the targeted state’s ability to earn revenue from economic output, supply vital services to the population, and maintain the military’s defensive capacities. By targeting electric stations, thermal power plants, and oil and gas production sites, Russia has sought to weaken the Ukrainian state’s capacity to withstand Russian military offensives. However, the goals have shifted since the war broke out in February 2022, from more random attacks to a very calibrated approach of undermining Ukraine’s energy security with the broader goal of pushing the country to capitulation. The changes in Russia’s approaches to targeting Ukraine’s infrastructure can be divided into three phases, as outlined below.

Phase 1: Russia’s occupation of energy infrastructure

In the first stage, the attacks on the Ukrainian energy sector were less pointed, mainly because Russia expected Kyiv to fall rather quickly within the first days and weeks of the war. Russia’s war behaviour started to change when Ukrainian forces started retaking control of the lost territories in late 2022. This could explain why Russia had to revise its approach towards the controlled Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (NPP), seized by Russian forces in March 2022.

At present, Russia’s control of the NPP in Zaporizhzhia, one of the largest in Europe, poses a threat to Ukraine and the international community, as shown by incidents such as the deliberate explosion of the Kakhovka Hydropower Plant in June 2023. The Russian military’s occupation of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant could lead to technological failures due to human error, which cannot be ruled out due to the exhaustion of Ukrainian personnel, who remain on-site for fear of Russian retaliation. The tense situation surrounding this nuclear power plant was not initially anticipated by Russia, which likely planned to seize control of Ukraine’s nuclear energy potential at the outset of the war of aggression. Ukrainian energy generation was excluded from Russia’s destructive war because it was intended to sustain Russian economic interests during the occupation and annexation phase. Consequently, when this objective became unattainable, the military strategy focused on calibrated airstrikes against Ukraine’s energy assets.

Phase 2: Targeted airstrikes on Ukraine’s energy sector for ‘winterisation’

The second phase of Russia’s shifting goals regarding Ukrainian energy infrastructure emerged during the second winter since the beginning of the war (i.e. from late 2022 to early 2023). This was when the concept of winterisation (‘the weaponisation of winter’) began to circulate, referring to the fact that Russian airstrikes were deliberately targeting power generation and thermal power plants across Ukraine as the weather grew colder, resulting in energy shortages. In addition to inflicting significant costs on the Ukrainian economy, Russia’s attempts to dismantle the energy sector were aimed at affecting the population’s resilience.

Weaponising the following winter (2023-2024) against Ukraine did not provide the immediate benefits Russia had hoped for. However, the damage was done, and Ukraine currently lacks the financial, technical, and human resources to restore approximately 50% of its unrepaired electricity infrastructure (as per 2024 data). Before the war, Ukraine produced 64% of its domestic energy consumption internally (as of 2019). Until reconstruction can begin, a large portion of Ukrainian power generation infrastructure will remain unavailable.

The destruction caused by the war in the winter of 2023-2024 made Ukraine more dependent upon increased energy imports from abroad, including from countries that maintain warm relations with Moscow, such as Hungary (+39%) and Slovakia (+23%). The country’s energy insecurity has exposed Ukraine to novel geopolitical challenges. For example, Slovakia has tried to condition future electricity exports to Ukraine on the resumption of Russian gas supplies, which Kyiv stopped transporting through its territory at the end of December 2024. This example clearly illustrates that Ukraine’s insufficient internal production capacity serves as a secondary avenue for Russian pressure.

Phase 3: Destroying Ukrainian gas production to drive up prices

Starting in 2025, Russia has adopted a new objective for Ukraine’s energy sector, which revolves around causing domestic gas shortages and more energy-induced costs for the public budget. In 2024, Ukraine’s national gas company, Naftogas, along with its subsidiaries Ukrgazvydobuvannya and Ukrnafta, produced 15.7 million cubic meters of natural gas. Evidence indicates that Russian missile attacks in early 2025 targeted gas production sites, 800 million cubic meters in February and March. The country’s annual consumption in the 2025-2026 fiscal year could replicate the previous years’ pattern, when it stabilised at about 18 billion cubic meters.

In the third phase, Russia’s destructive actions against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure sought to achieve two major effects. On the one hand, without fully functioning oil and gas production, Ukraine spends more on imports of these resources from other markets, driving energy prices up. Consequently, not only does Ukraine have to spend more on gas for the upcoming winter season and for general economic purposes, but it must also increase its imports from the rest of Europe, which keeps gas prices elevated. This situation aids Russia’s efforts to promote the return of its purportedly cheaper gas to the European gas market. Thus, Russia could leverage the situation to boost its own declining gas production, which was largely caused by the cessation of gas transit via Ukraine at the end of 2024. This helps to explain why, throughout three years of war, Russia has avoided striking Ukrainian gas pipelines through which gas was flowing to the EU before 2022.

On the other hand, Russian destruction of oil and gas production in Ukraine could serve to facilitate Donald Trump’s critical mineral deal, which Kyiv currently rejects. In need of investments to resume its oil and gas production, now under Russian attack, Ukraine could be forced to make concessions to the US, which wants to take over revenues from all natural resource production in Ukraine as part of the proposed mineral deal.

The goals pursued through Russian military attacks on Ukrainian critical energy infrastructure throughout three years of war have not yet been achieved, and the attacks are thus likely to continue. Some tactics, evident during Russia’s military strategy toward the Ukrainian energy system, including targeted airstrikes, are likely to be intensified in the coming days and weeks if they negatively affect Ukraine’s defensive capabilities. Others, such as the occupation of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, could remain intact in the postwar period.

Conclusions

The Ukrainian energy sector underwent gradual changes in Russian war strategy. Initially, the primary objective was to seize control of the Ukrainian energy system along with territorial occupation. When this mission was compromised by Kyiv’s defensive capabilities, Russia used airstrikes to destroy energy security, attempting to weaponise winter. Failing to achieve Ukrainian capitulation through ‘freezing,’ Russia decided to decimate Ukrainian domestic gas production to drive up energy costs for the economy and the population. Lessons must be learned from Ukraine’s war experience to create strong physical protection for energy infrastructure against state actors with harmful intentions in peacetime, as well as in anticipation of a possible new generation of wars in Europe.

Tags: Ukraine, Russia, War, Energy Prices, energy